Hearing Outcome for Former PS 1351 Houldey

IN THE MATTER OF THE POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020

IN THE MATTER OF AN ACCELERATED MISCONDUCT HEARING

 

 

 FORMER POLICE SERGEANT 1351 TRACY HOULDEY

 

 

___________________________________________________

 

DETERMINATION OF CHIEF CONSTABLE MARK WEBSTER

___________________________________________________

 

Preliminary matters

 

1. The accelerated misconduct hearing for former Police Sergeant Tracy Houldey was held in public on 18 September 2024. The Appropriate Authority was represented by Philip Agar. The officer was neither in attendance nor represented, and it was confirmed that this was by her own free choice.

 

Allegations

 

2. On 6 September 2024 the former officer was served with a notice of accelerated misconduct hearing proceedings outlining three allegations, which if proven, were assessed as amounting to gross misconduct. Those allegations were:

 

1. At 02:02 hours on 29 October 2021, whilst a Temporary Inspector carrying out the role of Force Incident Manager (FIM) within the Force Control Room, you ordered C5279 Laura Sheehy to conduct an Automatic Number Plate Recognition ('ANPR') check on your husband's vehicle. The check was conducted after Mr Houldey had been located and was made without a proper policing purpose.

 

That conduct breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour relating to Confidentiality and Discreditable Conduct and is alleged to amount to gross misconduct.

 

2.At 05:16 hours on 29 October 2021, whilst a Temporary Inspector carrying out the role of Force Incident Manager (FIM) within the Force Control Room, you ordered C9982 Laura Elliott to conduct an Automatic Number Plate Recognition ('ANPR') a check on your husband's vehicle. The check was conducted after Mr Houldey had been located and was made without a proper policing purpose.

 

That conduct breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour relating to Confidentiality and Discreditable Conduct and is alleged to amount to gross misconduct

 

3.On 15th July 2024, you were convicted following trial at Newcastle Crown Court of knowingly or recklessly obtaining personal without the consent of the data controller, contrary to section 170(1)(a) and 196(2) of the Data Protection Act. You were fined the sum of £700.00 and ordered to pay £570.00 in costs.

 

The above conduct is alleged to breach the Standards of Professional Behaviour relating to Discreditable Conduct and is alleged to amount to Gross Misconduct.

 

3. The former officer admitted the facts of the allegations in her Regulation 54 response, admitted that they amounted to a breach of the relevant standards, and admitted that those breaches amounted to misconduct. She denied that they amounted to gross misconduct on the basis that there was a policing purpose for her checks, because she thought that there was an issue with the ANPR system.

 

4. There was a typographical error in the Regulation 51 notice in that the officer referred to in the second allegation was named as Laura Sheehy not Laura Elliott. The Appropriate Authority asked for the second allegation to be amended to correct this. I allowed this amendment because there was no prejudice to the officer from doing so:

 

• the rest of the documents and evidence, including the Regulation 17, was clear as to the identity of the officer in respect of whom allegation 2 was made;

 

• the officer has been convicted of a criminal offence in respect of these allegations;

 

• the identity of the officer she asked to undertake these checks is not material, and she would not have been misled by the error in the Regulation 51.

 

Determination of conduct

 

5. In making my determination, I have assessed all relevant information made available to me in the supplied bundle. It was confirmed that all parties had access to the same information, and no submissions were made to introduce additional information on the day of the hearing. I have considered all representations made on behalf of the Appropriate Authority. Written representations were made on the former officer’s behalf. I have utilised the relevant sections of the College of Policing Document ‘Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings’ in formulating the rationale for my determination.

 

6. Before making my determination, I reminded myself of the definition of misconduct and gross misconduct as prescribed by regulation 2.

 

7. My findings are that this allegation is proven, on the balance of probabilities, and that the breaches of the Discreditable Conduct and Confidentiality standards constituted gross misconduct.

 

8. The basis for my finding that the allegation was proven is that the former officer has admitted making the checks, and has been convicted of a criminal offence in that respect.

 

9. I find that there was no policing purpose for the checks:

 

• Former PS Houldey’s partner had been found when she made them;

 

• I do not accept that she believed that there was anything wrong with the ANPR system:

 

• (i) If she had so believed, she would have said so to colleagues in the room at the time. She did not do so.

 

• (ii) If she had so believed she would have contacted the ANPR Single Point of Contact to ask if there was an issue. She did not do so.

 

• (iii) If she had so believed she should have contacted other local forces to see whether they were experiencing issues. She did not do so.

 

• (iv) If she had so believed she could have run a different vehicle to check if it was working. The only vehicle she ran was her partner’s, twice.

 

• (v) ANPR is a core system for the force, and any issue would require prompt action to correct. The former officers actions were not what would be expected if she genuinely believed that there was an issue with the system.

 

10. The basis for my finding that the allegation breaches the Discreditable Conduct standard is that the former officer’s behaviour brings discredit on the police and undermines public confidence, and that she has been convicted of a criminal offence, that in itself is highly discreditable.

 

11. The basis for my finding that the allegation breaches the Confidentiality standard is that by making these checks former PS Houldey was effectively engaging in unauthorised surveillance of her partner’s movements, in a manner that invaded his privacy.

 

12. The basis for my finding of gross misconduct is:

 

• that the officer is culpable and entirely responsible for her actions, which were intentional. A court has determined that this is a criminal conviction and has imposed sanctions which in themselves demonstrate the gravity of this misconduct. Culpability is therefore high.

 

• those actions significantly harm public trust and confidence. The public entrust the police with access to their personal information on the basis that that access will be used responsibly. This officer’s abuse of that access harms the trust placed in police officers by the public.

 

13. This breach exceeds the threshold of purely unacceptable or improper behaviour and reaches the threshold of being so serious that it justifies dismissal.

 

Determination of outcome

 

14. Having determined that these allegations amounted to gross misconduct, I invited representations from the Appropriate Authority on the appropriate outcome in this matter.

 

15. Submissions were made by the Appropriate Authority that the appropriate outcome in this case would be dismissal. In brief, they submitted that:

 

• This was a serious matter involving invasion of privacy and misuse of police powers, resulting in a criminal conviction;

 

• Personal mitigation should be given limited weight.

 

16. Submissions were made in the former Officer’s Regulation 54 that:

 

• There was limited harm, and no infringement on Human Rights;

 

• There was no premeditation or planning, or abuse of trust or position;

 

• There was no attempt to blame others;

 

• The officer has accepted full culpability, and co-operated with the investigation;

 

• There is no local or national concern.

 

17. No personal mitigation was put forward orally on behalf of the former officer. I have taken account of the following matters put forward in her Regulation 54 response:

 

• Her long service;

 

• The breakdown of her marriage.

 

18. I note also that the officer alleges that the investigation was biased and that other named officers have maliciously fabricated information submitted to the investigation. For the avoidance of doubt I find that there is no foundation to these allegations.

 

19. My core duty here has been to ensure that whatever decision I make upholds public confidence both in Cleveland and in policing more widely. My role is not punitive as that is a duty that is undertaken by the criminal justice system. Throughout my deliberations, I have been resolutely focused on maintaining public confidence in Cleveland Police.

 

20. Any action I take today has been to balance the officer’s rights proportionately with the requirement to maintain public confidence, and to deter misconduct.

 

21. It having been found at stage one of proceedings that the conduct constitutes Gross Misconduct, the outcomes available to me are:

 

• To take no disciplinary action;

 

• To find that the former officer would have been dismissed if she had not resigned.

 

22. I considered these potential outcomes in order from the lowest sanction through to dismissal and assessed them as to how they may meet the need to fulfil the purpose of the misconduct proceedings, and the purpose of imposing sanctions.

 

Seriousness

 

23. I have considered the seriousness of the misconduct that gave rise to the officer’s appearance at the hearing today, in accordance with the College of Policing’s Guidance on Outcomes, and set out my conclusions and the reasons for them below.

 

Culpability

 

24. I have considered the officer’s culpability in this case and make the following observations:

 

• The officer’s conduct was deliberate, criminal, and repeated (albeit only twice);

 

• I have taken account specifically of paragraphs 4.34-4.39 of the Guidance on Outcomes. I agree with the Guidance that improper access to confidential information is a particular concern for this force, and that the officer has abused her position by making these ANPR checks. ANPR data is sensitive as it is an investigative tool, and her use of it was a breach of her partner’s personal privacy.

 

• I therefore assess this officer’s culpability as high.

 

Harm

 

25. I have considered the harm caused by the officer’s actions in this case and make the following observations:

 

• There has been an infringement of the rights of the former officer’s partner, namely his right to privacy;

 

• There is some harm to public confidence and the reputation of Cleveland Police and policing in general. The public rightly expect that officers entrusted with access to their personal data will not abuse that trust for non-policing purposes.;

 

• I find therefore that the harm in this case was medium.

 

Aggravating Factors

 

26. I have carefully considered the aggravating factors listed within the guidance and any other issues outside of those which may have been said to have aggravated the actions she took.

 

• I do consider that the officer’s actions were an abuse of her police powers, but I do not double-count this as I have taken it into account in assessing culpability;

 

• The former officer was in a leadership role where she was expected to act as a role model, as a temporary Inspector with significant responsibility.

 

 

Mitigation

 

27. The purpose of mitigation is to reduce the seriousness of the conduct. I have found that the following apply here:

 

• This was a single episode of misconduct;

 

• Stress in relation to the officer’s relationship.

 

28. These matters do not significantly affect the former officer’s culpability for her actions.

 

29. I do not agree that the officer has accepted full culpability, or that she is remorseful. She has put forward an account in her Regulation 54 which I have rejected, and does not accept that her actions amount to gross misconduct.

 

30. I have taken into account the officer’s record of service, which is not to her credit. I make it clear that I would have reached the same conclusion if her record of service were spotless.

 

31. I make clear that I have not approached this as a case of operational dishonesty. There is no allegation of a breach of the honesty and integrity standard here, and the outcome I impose is in relation to the proven allegations only.

 

Determination

 

32. I find that the appropriate outcome in this case would have been dismissal without notice:

 

• For the reasons set out above this is a serious matter, with limited mitigation.;

 

• My primary motivation in this case is to ensure that it is plain that such behaviour will not be tolerated by officers of Cleveland Police, and to deter future misconduct by other officers. I consider that this outcome will help to achieve this aim and prevent future misconduct.

 

• To take no action would not be adequate to uphold public confidence in policing and maintain the high standards that I expect of officers of Cleveland Police;

 

• I have also considered the need to prevent this officer from committing future misconduct. This can only be achieved by her dismissal, and placing her on the barred list.

 

33. As a consequence of the above I indicate that the officer’s details should be included within the Police Barred List (Regulation 3(2) of the Police Barred List and Police Advisory List Regulations 2017).

 

34. I am aware of the officer’s right to appeal in accordance with the Police Appeals Tribunal Rules 2020. The officer should provide notice of her intention to appeal to the Appropriate Authority within 10 working days of receipt of this written determination.

 

 

 

Chief Constable Webster

18 September 2024