FOI 348-24 Cyber Attacks on Force
Enquiry Reference: 348 - 24
I write in connection with regards to your Freedom of Information request, Below is your request and our response.
I am writing to politely request the following data under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) on cyber attacks affecting Cleveland Police. Where possible please provide data broken down by calendar year or failing that, by relevant 12-month period (e.g. 2021/22 2022/23 etc.) for which data is available.
- How many times has your organisation experienced an attempted cyber-attack in the last two financial years?
- Have you ever reported any cyber-related incidents to the NCSC and if so, how many in the last two financial years?
- Thinking about cyber-attacks where the criminal was able to obtain data or disable systems, how much have these cost the organisation?
- How much of the organisation’s total annual budget is spent on cyber support, protection and computer systems?
- How many people are employed by the organisation to oversee cyber support and programmes?
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon, Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act requires that I provide the applicant with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and c) state (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.
The Cleveland Police Service can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to your request as the duty in s1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(1) National Security;
Section 31(1) Law enforcement;
Sections 24, and 31 are prejudice based qualified exemptions and there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in confirming or not that the information is held as well as carrying out a public interest test.
Harm in Confirming or Denying that Information is held
To confirm or deny whether any further information is held in respect of successful or attempted cyber-attacks resulting in Data Breaches would provide actual knowledge of where an attempt has been made, it if it has or has not been successful. Confirming that such information is not held may assist potential attackers by indicating that an attack had gone undetected. Equally, confirming information is held would enable understanding of where attacks have been successful, and possible weaknesses exist. Attackers may then be able to tailor their methods to increase their chances of success.
To confirm or deny whether information is held in respect of any leaked data as a result of an attack would, in effect, confirm that there had been successful cyber-attacks made against the force, which would present harm as detailed above.
Furthermore, in order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour it is vital that the police and other agencies have the ability to work together, where necessary covertly, in order to obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to ensure the arrest and prosecution of offenders who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism, whereby their modus operandi may involve cyber-attacks on secure databases. In order to achieve this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place with other police forces and security bodies within the United Kingdom in order to support counter-terrorism measures in the fight to deprive terrorist networks of their ability to commit crime. To confirm or deny specific details of any breaches of information technology and security would be extremely useful to those involved in terrorist activity as it would enable them to map vulnerable information security databases.
Public Interest Considerations
Section 24(2) National Security
Factors in favour of confirming or denying that information is held
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and how resources are distributed within an area of policing. To confirm information is held regarding successful cyber-attacks causing Data Breaches would enable the general public to hold the police to account ensuring all such breaches are recorded and investigated appropriately. With the call for transparency of public spending this would enable improved public debate.
Factors against confirming or denying that information is held
Security measures are put in place to protect the community we serve. As evidenced within the harm to confirm whether any cyber-attacks have been successful would highlight to terrorists and individuals intent on carrying out criminal activity vulnerabilities within the police which could be further exploited.
Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information (such as the citing of an exemption which confirms information pertinent to this request is held, or conversely, stating ‘no information is held’) which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force’s ability to monitor terrorist activity.
Irrespective of what information is or isn’t held, the public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.
The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would be even more impactive when linked to other information gathered from various sources about terrorism. The more information disclosed over time will give a more detailed account of the tactical infrastructure of not only a force area but also the country as a whole.
Any incident that results from such a disclosure would, by default, affect National Security.
Section 31 (3) – Law Enforcement
Factors favouring confirming or denying that information is held
Confirmation that information exists relevant to this request would lead to a better informed public which may encourage individuals to provide intelligence in order to reduce such security breaches.
Factors against confirming nor denying that information is held.
Confirmation or denial that information is held in this case would suggest the police take their responsibility to protect information and information systems from unauthorised access, destruction, etc., dismissively and inappropriately.
Balancing Test
The points above highlight the merits of confirming or denying the requested information exists. The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. As part of that policing purpose, information is gathered which can be highly sensitive relating to high profile investigative activity. Weakening the mechanisms used to monitor any type of criminal activity, and specifically terrorist activity would place the security of the country at an increased level of danger.
In addition anything that places that confidence at risk, no matter how generic, would undermine any trust or confidence individuals have in the Police Service. Therefore, at this moment in time, it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test favours neither confirming nor denying that information is held.
The Cleveland Police response to your request is unique and it should be noted that Police Forces do not use generic systems or identical procedures to capture and record data therefore responses from Cleveland Police should not be used as a comparison with any other force response you receive.
If you are not satisfied with this response or any actions taken in dealing with your request, you have the right to request an independent internal review of your case under our review procedure. The APP College of Policing guidance states that a request for internal review should be made within 20 working days of the date on this response or 40 working days if extenuating circumstances to account for the delay can be evidenced.
Yours sincerely
Information Rights Decision Maker