FOI 852/24 Gender Diversity Roles
Dear Sir/Madam
Enquiry Reference: 852 - 24
I write in connection with regards to your Freedom of Information, firstly please accept my apology for the delay in responding. Below is your request and our response.
- Please provide the current number and percentage of women in intelligence leadership roles within your police service intelligence operation units. For example, analysts, intelligence managers, senior intelligence managers and other supervisory roles.
Staff - 39 posts covering the above in the current Establishment. 34 held by females which is 87%
Officers – 10 posts covering the above in the current Establishment. 3 held by females which is 30%
- What efforts are being made to ensure gender diversity in these positions within the services intelligence unit?
From a recruitment point of view, we appoint on merit – all applications are anonymised when they are sent to the hiring manager so they are unaware of the candidates gender when they receive the application.
- What specific programs/initiatives or policies does your police service have in place to promote gender diversity and support women in advancing to leadership roles, specifically within the intelligence units?
There is a Women’s Working Group to support gender equality within the police ranks – mostly focussing on police officer promotions.
- Those in intelligence roles such as covert/overt surveillance operations, undercover operations officer, field intelligence officers etc- what is the current number and percentage of women in these roles?
5 held by females which is 21%
- Over the past 5 years how has the number and percentage of women in intelligence leadership roles within your police service changed?
Data from 1/9/19 shows:
Staff – 28 posts in the Establishment covering the roles named in Q1. 27 held by females which is 96%. Currently this is 87%
Officers – 14 posts in the Establishment covering the roles names in Q1. 3 held by females which is 21%
Having made enquiries within the Force the above information is all the information we can disclose and for anything else we would rely on the following:
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon, Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act requires that I provide the applicant with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and c) state (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.
Section 24 (2) National Security
Section 31 (3)Law Enforcement
Overall harm for sections 24, 31:
Undercover police tactics are, by their very nature, sensitive. They include techniques and controls that will be of great interest to criminals who are trying to develop measures to counter them. This includes identifying and mapping the deployment of undercover officers (UCOs) with the intention of establishing how and when UCOs have been deployed and/or may be deployed in future.
To confirm or deny whether Cleveland Police, or other police forces utilise UCOs and how many would undermine the purpose of undercover operations. By providing the information requested (if held), it would allow comparison between forces across the country and enable the criminal fraternity to build a picture of what resources are in place. Consequently, this would prejudice the effectiveness of the police service as it would allow inferences to be drawn about force level capability and would identify vulnerability around the country.
The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The confirmation or denial of the information sought would impact on the effectiveness of police procedures and investigations thereby hindering the prevention and detection of crime.
Public interest Tests 24,31
S24 - Public Interest favouring Disclosure:
The information simply relates to women in covert roles and their percentage. To confirm whether information exists would enable the general public to understand more about equality and the balance on genders within policing.
S24 - Public Interest favouring Non-Disclosure:
No information which may aid criminals or those who present any other threats to national security, such as through terrorism, should be disclosed. To what extent confirmation or denial may aid such a fraternity is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force’s ability to safeguard national security interests.
The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection. The only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain and in some circumstances such as these, confirmation or denial that information is held.
The cumulative effect of criminals gathering information from various sources would build a picture of vulnerabilities within certain scenarios, such as whether or not UCOs are located within a specific policing areas. The more information disclosed over time will provide a more detailed account of the tactical infrastructure of not only a force area but also the country as a whole.
Any incident which results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.
S31 - Public Interest favouring Disclosure:
Confirming or denying whether Cleveland Police holds information relevant to this request the public would be able to see the proactive ways that the police are continually recruiting to equal opportunity roles within policing. Cleveland Police is committed to openness and transparency with the general public. When a request for information is made to them, it is correct that the police make appropriate information available to the general public.
S31 - Public Interest favouring Non-Disclosure:
Cleveland Police has a duty of care to the community at large and public safety is of paramount importance. If an FOI disclosure reveals information to the world, by not adopting an NCND position, it would not only compromise and undermine the security of the national infrastructure, but the effective delivery of operational law enforcement would also be undermined as offenders could use this knowledge to their advantage which would compromise public safety and more worryingly encourage offenders to carry our further crimes.
Cleveland Police has a statutory role in investigating criminal offences. Cleveland Police will not disclose, through the duty to confirm or deny whether information is held under the Act, whether or not UCOs are used, and by extension, have been deployed. This information would allow criminals to map forces that might be using UCOs and assist them to predict where current UCOs are deployed and/or where UCOs may be deployed in future. This information could also, in certain circumstances, compromise police investigations, tactics and/or sources of information. Where compromise occurs, this would adversely affect Cleveland Police ability to prevent and detect crime and apprehend and prosecute offenders. This would be contrary to the public interest.
Balancing Test:
After weighing up the competing interests I have determined that the disclosure of the above information would not be in the public interest. I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh the considerations favouring non-disclosure.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and Cleveland Police will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so could undermine National Security or compromise Law Enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by the criminal fraternity through the use of UCOs, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both National Security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.
Please note that all statistical data supplied in relation to Freedom of Information requests is a snapshot of data held at the time the request was received by the Freedom of Information office and is subject to constant change/updates.
The Cleveland Police response to your request is unique and it should be noted that Police Forces do not use generic systems or identical procedures to capture and record data therefore responses from Cleveland Police should not be used as a comparison with any other force response you receive.
If you are not satisfied with this response or any actions taken in dealing with your request, you have the right to request an independent internal review of your case under our review procedure. The Freedom of Information Code of Practice (see below link) states that a request for internal review should be made within 20 working days of the date on this response or 40 working days if extenuating circumstances to account for the delay can be evidenced. Public authorities are not obliged to accept internal reviews after this date.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-of-information-code-of-practice
Yours sincerely
Information Rights Decision Maker