FOI 527-24 Drones
Enquiry Reference: 527 - 24
I write in connection with regards to your Freedom of Information. Below is your request and our response.
I have read recent reports that the force is using drones. I would like to know.
- If you are using drones for surveillance purposes, on which legal basis do you rely for the collection and storage of data collected by drones?
- This is in line with the requirements of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice. These codes apply to the use of surveillance camera systems as defined by Section 29(6) of PoFA 2012 that operate in public places in England and Wales, regardless of whether there is any live viewing or recording of images or information or associated data
- Please provide us with the following:
- a) any guidance and/or policy you are relying on for the deployment of drones.
- b) Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) in relation to the use of drones if one has been completed
- We operate under an ‘Operation Authorisation’ which is essentially a commercial licence issued by the Civil Aviation Authority. Our drones do not record by default. We do not require a court order to fly drones, we are permitted to by the Civil Aviation Authority.
We have a Data Protection Impact Assessment in place, which stipulates how we handle the information obtained but would also rely on the below Section 31 exemption.
- Please advise if the sensitive personal data recorded in the drone footage is subject to GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018?
- Yes
- If question 3 applies please provide instructions to exercises individual right to request data and/or request deletion of data?
- You can use the link below to request information about yourself https://www.cleveland.police.uk/
- Or post to Information Rights Department
St Marks House,
St Marks Court,
Thornaby,
Stockton on Tees,
TS8 9LB
- Or email :
- Please provide which rank of police officers/staff are permitted to fly said drones?
- Staff including Police Community Support Officer’s, Police Constable’s and Sergeant’s
We also rely on the following:
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon, Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act requires that I provide the applicant with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and c) state (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.
Cleveland Police can neither confirm nor deny that it holds the information relevant to your request as the duty in Section 1(1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) Information Supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.
Section 24(2) National Security.
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement.
Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case.
Confirming or denying the existence of whether any other information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies. None of the above can be viewed as an inference that the information you seek does or does not exist.
Sections 24 and 31 are prejudiced based qualified exemptions and there is a requirement to evidence the prejudice (harm) in disclosure and consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming or denying that information is held is appropriate.
A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual.
Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, providing any further information relating to specific tools or technologies utilised for drone forensics would reveal our digital forensic capability more broadly, which would be of intelligence value to criminals.
Disclosure of policing tactics and the tools at the police’s disposal will mean that those members of the public who are committing crimes and pose a risk to the public, would be able to formulate ways to circumvent the tactics and tools used. If disclosed the tactics will become less effective and will mean that the police are not able to detect and prevent crime, apprehend or prosecute offenders or to administer justice for the wider community.
There is always a duty of care to the general public and the Police Service has a clear responsibility to ensure the prevention or detection of crime, and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders is always delivered. There are a number of tactics available to the Police Service to ensure the effective delivery of operational law enforcement. In this case, such policing activity is required to undertake fair investigations where it may be necessary to progress a range of reasonable lines of enquiry. An example of this maybe where accounts are provided to the police by victims, suspects and witnesses. But by the nature of requirements, a forensic strategy and data extraction may well be required for further evidential purposes.
As such, the disclosure of any further information which would hinder the forces law enforcement functions cannot be in the public interest.
Public Interest Test
Factors favouring disclosure for S31 - Where public funds are being spent, there is a public interest in accountability and justifying the use of public money. Disclosure of the requested information would enable the public to assess whether the force has appropriately taken steps to help reduce crime by such means as the use of technological assistance. Release would enhance public debate as to whether or not the force is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by the criminal fraternity.
Factors against disclosure for S31 - Disclosure that reveals our digital forensic capability’s would compromise law enforcement tactics. Criminals could use the information to target areas of weakness knowing that their activities are less likely to be detected. It may be used by criminals who are intent on pursuing their criminal activity, to identify and exploit the limitations of these resources.
This is an area of increasing technological changes and as such the use of drone data to assist with investigations or operations is a valuable tool. To release information relating to tools or technologies utilised for drone forensics would have a detrimental effect on our policing capabilities. Therefore, to mitigate any risks, disclosure of this information needs to be protected, to ensure that those with intent to do so cannot manipulate it or undermine its purpose in any way.
Any disclosure of information which would compromise law enforcement tactics and thus lead to more crime being committed by reducing the opportunity for the prevention and detection of crime, would therefore increase the risk to public safety, which is not in the public interest.
Balancing Test
Law enforcement is of paramount importance and the Police service will not disclose information if to do so, it would undermine its purpose and place the safety of individual(s) at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of using public money in policing appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of law enforcement, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The use of digital forensic tools, whether for the extraction of drone data, or any other aspect of policing within the digital environment, is a police tactic that is open to police forces for the purpose of law enforcement and can assist in the prevention and detection of crime. Any disclosure which hinders our capability and assists criminals cannot be in the public interest.
It is for these reasons that I have determined that the balance test favours non-disclosure of the requested information.
The Cleveland Police response to your request is unique and it should be noted that Police Forces do not use generic systems or identical procedures to capture and record data therefore responses from Cleveland Police should not be used as a comparison with any other force response you receive.
If you are not satisfied with this response or any actions taken in dealing with your request, you have the right to request an independent internal review of your case under our review procedure. The Freedom of Information Code of Practice (see below link) states that a request for internal review should be made within 20 working days of the date on this response or 40 working days if extenuating circumstances to account for the delay can be evidenced. Public authorities are not obliged to accept internal reviews after this date.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-of-information-code-of-practice
Yours sincerely
Information Rights Decision Maker