FOI 121/26 Informants

Date: 09/03/26

Enquiry Reference:  121- 26                                                 

 

I write in connection with regards to your Freedom of Information request.  Your request is below with our response.

 

• The total amount of money your force has spent on informants or Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) in each of the past two years (please use the two last full reporting years, whether this is calendar, financial or another period).

Answer

23/24 - £31,075

24/25 - £31,460

Above is all the information we will disclose. For anything else we would rely on the following exemptions.

 

Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1)(b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon s17 of FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.

 

The Cleveland Police Service can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any further information relevant to your request as the duty in s1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:

 

Section 23(5) Security Bodies

Section 24(2) National Security

Section 30(3) Investigations

 

Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest. Confirming or denying the existence of whether any information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.

 

Section 24 is a prejudiced based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to evidence the prejudice (harm) in disclosure and consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming or denying that information is held is appropriate.

 

Section 30 is a class based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming or denying information is held is appropriate.

 

Harm

Harm for neither confirming nor denying that any other information is held for Section 24

Disclosure of informant data could impact on the recruitment and retention of CHIS in general, due to the perception of (rather than the actual) risk of identification. The disclosure of the requested information would damage national security through discouraging current national security CHIS from cooperating with the police service in other geographical areas or preventing the recruitment of national security CHIS in the future – regardless of whether the area in question actually currently runs CHIS reporting on serious crime, terrorist or other threats.

Public Interest Test

Factors favouring confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 24

Confirmation or denial that any other information exists relevant to the request would lead to a better-informed public and the public are entitled to know how public funds are spent. The information simply relates to national security and disclosure would not actually harm it.

Factors against confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 24

Other organisations outside the police service are also widely engaged in rewarding informants in a number of ways, and therefore by confirming or denying that any other information exists relevant to the request would harm the close relationship that exists with such organisations, where trust and confidence in this specific area has been built up in the exchange of information and financial assistance during the Criminal Justice process.

To confirm or deny whether Cleveland Police hold any additional information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place in a given area. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security.

By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Factors favouring confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 30

The confirmation or denial that information is held would provide a greater insight into policing and how resources are allocated to investigate crimes. The confirmation or denial that any other information is or is not held would identify how often Cleveland Police relies on CHIS within this type of investigation.

Factors against confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 30

To confirm or deny that any other information relevant to this request is held would provide details of any previous or on-going investigations. Informant’s information assists police investigations and provides vital intelligence. To confirm that Cleveland Police have used informants with previous investigations and criminal convictions in specific investigations would provide sensitive information that would undermine policing and investigations. Investigations, although complete, may have included information from an informant of the type described and serve to undermine any investigations that have taken place based on the original investigation.

 

 

Balance Test

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing, and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security and maintenance of investigations are of paramount importance, and the Police service will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security and investigations. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area. As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

 

• The amount of money that was spent on informants in protest or activist groups
  • The amount of this that was spent on informants in a) far right groups b) pro-Palestine groups and c) environmental groups.

Answer

Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1)(b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon s17 of FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.

 

The Cleveland Police Service can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to your request as the duty in s1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:

 

Section 23(5) Security Bodies

Section 24(2) National Security

Section 30(3) Investigations

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Section 40(5) Personal details.

 

Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest. Confirming or denying the existence of whether any information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.

 

Section 24 is a prejudiced based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to evidence the prejudice (harm) in disclosure and consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming or denying that information is held is appropriate.

 

Section 30 is a class based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming or denying information is held is appropriate.

 

Section 31 is a prejudice based and qualified exemption, which requires the Harm in disclosure to be identified and additionally requires a public interest test to be conducted.

 

Sections 40 is a class based absolute exemptions, which means that the legislators have identified that harm would be caused by any release.  In addition, there is no requirement to consider the public interest test

 

Harm

Harm for neither confirming nor denying that any other information is held for Section 24

Disclosure of informant data could impact on the recruitment and retention of CHIS in general, due to the perception of (rather than the actual) risk of identification. The disclosure of the requested information would damage national security through discouraging current national security CHIS from cooperating with the police service in other geographical areas or preventing the recruitment of national security CHIS in the future – regardless of whether the area in question actually currently runs CHIS reporting on serious crime, terrorist or other threats.

Public Interest Test

Factors favouring confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 24

Confirmation or denial that any other information exists relevant to the request would lead to a better-informed public and the public are entitled to know how public funds are spent. The information simply relates to national security and disclosure would not actually harm it.

Factors against confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 24

Other organisations outside the police service are also widely engaged in rewarding informants in a number of ways, and therefore by confirming or denying that any other information exists relevant to the request would harm the close relationship that exists with such organisations, where trust and confidence in this specific area has been built up in the exchange of information and financial assistance during the Criminal Justice process.

To confirm or deny whether Cleveland Police hold any additional information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place in a given area. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security.

By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Factors favouring confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 30

The confirmation or denial that information is held would provide a greater insight into policing and how resources are allocated to investigate crimes. The confirmation or denial that any other information is or is not held would identify how often Cleveland Police relies on CHIS within this type of investigation.

Factors against confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 30

To confirm or deny that any other information relevant to this request is held would provide details of any previous or on-going investigations. Informant’s information assists police investigations and provides vital intelligence. To confirm that Cleveland Police have used informants with previous investigations and criminal convictions in specific investigations would provide sensitive information that would undermine policing and investigations. Investigations, although complete, may have included information from an informant of the type described and serve to undermine any investigations that have taken place based on the original investigation.

Factors favouring disclosure for Section 31

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve and there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations to ensure investigations, enquiries, etc. are dealt with appropriately.

Factors favouring Non-Disclosure:

To confirm or deny that Cleveland Police hold information could compromise law enforcement tactics which would lead to a hindrance on the Police Force’s ability to prevent and detect crimes.  Vulnerable areas could be identified by disclosure leading to more criminal activity placing the public in harm’s way.  

Factors against confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 40

Under subsection 2 of Section 40 of The Freedom of Information Act, information is exempt information if it constitutes personal information of which the applicant is not the data subject. In order to be considered exempt personal information, the information must satisfy one of two conditions. It must either be information which would be exempt from disclosure to the data subject under the provisions of the Data Protection Act 2018, or disclosure of the information would contravene any of the Data Protection Principles or cause damage or distress to the data subject.

On this occasion the information requested is clearly personal information and would contravene the first principle of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) - lawfulness, fairness and transparency, what are the likely expectations of the data subjects, in that would they expect the Cleveland Police to release personal details to the world, since release of information under The Freedom of Information Act 2000, is release to the world at large and not just to the individual applicant and as such I believe to do so would amount to unfair processing and hence therefore is exempt under Section 40(2)(a).

 

Balancing Test:

 

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing, and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security and maintenance of investigations are of paramount importance, and the Police service will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security and investigations. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area. As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

 

In accordance with Section 17(4) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this notification acts as a Refusal Notice to this section of your request.

No inference can be taken from this refusal that the information you have requested does or does not exist. 

If you are not satisfied with this response or any actions taken in dealing with your request, you have the right to request an independent internal review of your case under our review procedure. The Freedom of Information Code of Practice (see below link) states that a request for internal review should be made within 20 working days of the date on this response or 40 working days if extenuating circumstances to account for the delay can be evidenced. Public authorities are not obliged to accept internal reviews after this date.

 

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-of-information-code-of-practice

 

Yours sincerely

Information Rights Decision Maker