FOI 44/26 Protests and Facial Recognition
Date: 06/02/26
Enquiry Reference: 44 -26
I write in connection with regards to your Freedom of Information request.
Below is your request and our response.
Please provide information for the past 2 years:
- An Excel spreadsheet detailing all any deployments of live facial recognition technology to protests in the past 3 years. Please include the date, approximate location, what technology was used (cameras, algorithms) number of matches, number of arrests following identification, what suspected crime any arrests were for, and details of any charges/referrals to CPS following successful identification and arrest at protests.
- No information held. We do not use live facial recognition technology.
- An Excel spreadsheet detailing all instances where footage of protests captured by police officers has been analysed by retrospective facial recognition technology. Please include the date and approximate location the footage was taken, the brand and model of camera or device the footage was taken on, any matches, whether those matches were against a local database or the police national database, what suspected crime any arrests resulting from matches were for, and any charges/referrals to CPS
- See below exemption.
- An Excel spreadsheet detailing any instances of arrests following identification with operator-initiated facial recognition at protests. Please include the date, approximate location, what software or algorithm was used, the suspected crimes for which people were arrested, and if those crimes were charged/ referred to the CPS.
- No information held. We do not use Operator initiated
Having made enquiries within the Force above is all the information we hold. Please note that all statistical data supplied in relation to Freedom of Information requests is a snapshot of data held at the time the request was received by the Freedom of Information office and is subject to constant change/updates.
Having made enquiries within the Force above is all the information we can disclose and for anything else we would rely on the following:
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon, Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act requires that I provide the applicant with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and c) state (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.
The Cleveland Police Service can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to your request as the duty in s1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) Information Supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.
Section 24(2) National Security
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case.
Confirming or denying the existence of whether any other information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies. None of the above can be viewed as an inference that the information you seek does or does not exist.
Sections 24, and 31 are prejudice based qualified exemptions and there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in confirming or not that the information is held as well as carrying out a public interest test.
Overall Harm
Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information relating to the covert practise of facial recognition would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the force are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities. Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may not deploy the use of facial recognition would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as ‘substantial’, see below link:
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels
The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists.
It is well established that police forces use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.
Confirming or denying whether any information is held relating to the covert use of facial recognition technology would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities. This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics are or are not deployed. This can be useful information to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.
The Cleveland Police response to your request is unique and it should be noted that Police Forces do not use generic systems or identical procedures to capture and record data therefore responses from Cleveland Police should not be used as a comparison with any other force response you receive.
If you are not satisfied with this response or any actions taken in dealing with your request, you have the right to request an independent internal review of your case under our review procedure. The Freedom of Information Code of Practice (see below link) states that a request for internal review should be made within 20 working days of the date on this response or 40 working days if extenuating circumstances to account for the delay can be evidenced. Public authorities are not obliged to accept internal reviews after this date.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-of-information-code-of-practice
Yours sincerely
Information Rights Decision Maker